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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING CRIMINAL LAW IN AN ERA OF GOVERNING
THROUGH CRIME

JONATHAN SIMON*

I. INTRODUCTION: WHERE TO BEGIN
Where to begin a first-year course on Criminal Law provides a central
dilemma. Since Wechsler and Michael’s influential 1940 casebook, most
casebook authors have placed the subject of punishment early in the book.
This part generally discusses the four familiar “theories” of punishment—
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution. Placed early in the
book, they provide a framework that students and teachers can discuss as they
proceed through the canonical subjects such as actus reus, mens rea, or
causation. For almost any case that is used to illustrate one of these topics, it is
fair to ask whether the case will offer fertile ground for second guessing the
choices of the legislature or court as to whether a particular set of events falls
on one side or the other of the boundaries of criminal liability.
For example, take Mr. Proctor—whose prosecution for “keeping a place”
with the intent of running an illegal drinking establishment in Oklahoma under
a 1913 state law was thrown out by the Criminal Court of Appeals on the
grounds that it was in excess of the penal law making powers of the
legislature.1 Proctor had not yet taken possession of any illegal liquor, and
thus in the view of the court he had yet to accomplish a criminal act. 2 The law
was an early part of the legal reform wave that brought prohibition to the
nation as a whole in 1923. The court had no quarrel with the legislature’s
power to criminalize the alcohol trade, only with whether Proctor had
completed a sufficient amount of the criminal act.3 Although the court never
takes up the question of punishment, its decision can be questioned on whether
it can be defended in terms of the reasons for punishment. Is Proctor
dangerous as the soon-to-be purveyor of an addictive product that the
legislature has defined as a serious social danger? Does the Proctor court truly
believe that there is a meaningful requirement of retribution that has not yet

* Professor of Law/Jurisprudence and Social Policy, UC Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law.
1. Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771, 772 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918).
2. Id. at 774.
3. See id.
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been earned or is the opinion primarily a Lochner era paean to formalism and
property rights?4
This punishment theory can be revisited throughout the course and is
particularly fitting with the Model Penal Code (“Code”) focus of most
casebooks. The Code’s underlying jurisprudence is one acutely sensitive to the
role of the general part of criminal law as an important regulator of the
government’s power to punish. The Code’s authors, especially its general
reporter Herbert Wechsler, were strong supporters of social defense criminal
law that recognized the trio of rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation (in
roughly that order) as the appropriate modern grounds for criminal law. They
wanted to adjust common law boundary rules in ways that facilitated the
rational extension of law enforcement and prosecutorial power (which was,
after all, expected to result in “treatment” for the guilty).
I have been reluctant to spend too much time in my Criminal Law course
on the “theories” of punishment for several reasons. First, for most of the last
century our laws defining criminal liability, and rules for attributing that
liability to particular individuals, have been decoupled from the distribution of
punishment. For much of the twentieth century, decoupling took the form of
indeterminate sentencing systems under which those convicted of felonies
received nominally long sentences, even life, but which were routinely set at
much lower levels by the actions of administrative bodies known commonly as
“parole boards.”5 Such administrative discretion has been cut back or
eliminated in more recent decades. The discretion has largely been shifted to
prosecutors who can take advantage of many overlapping offenses and a range
of new laws enhancing sentences for recidivists and armed criminals. As
William Stuntz has argued, the political dynamics created by legislative
competition for penal severity and the power of prosecutors often makes the
boundaries drawn by substantive criminal law irrelevant to punishment.6
This reality can easily be cloaked by the presumption in both common law
and modern case law that the boundary-setting problems that preoccupy any
casebook are vitally important for distributing punishment. The reform of
criminal law recommended by the Model Penal Code7 was aimed in large part
at making the grading of punishment consistent with the principle objectives of

4. “It cannot be true that ‘the keeping of a place’ coupled with the present intent to violate
the law, constitutes an overt act.” Id. at 772.
5. California’s indeterminate sentencing law was exemplary, giving its “Adult Authority”
power to set the total prison and parole sentence after as little a six months in prison for crimes
with nominal life sentences. See JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 123, 123 n.24 (1993).
6. William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
534-35 (2001).
7. MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES (1985). The Code
is given extensive coverage by many, if not most, contemporary Criminal Law casebooks.
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the Code, especially the deterrence of dangerous behavior and the “treatment”
of those not deterred.8 The current era of harsh sentencing laws, however, has
dramatically transformed that grading logic. Not only is “treatment” no longer
anything like a presumptive logic of criminal law, the very linkage between
culpability—whether tweaked toward dangerousness as the Model Penal Code
does or anchored in retribution—has been loosened. In an era of “mass
imprisonment,”9 the individual criminal, whether the subject of deterrence,
retribution, or treatment, is displaced by an operation that works on the
population.10
Figure 1

I begin my class with Figure 1 above. This reflects not the logic of
punishment, but rather its effects. The dramatic rise in imprisonment recorded
in that graph contrasts with a relatively gentle fluctuation in the national
imprisonment rate between the beginning of hard federal data on the subject in
1925 and the late 1970s. The data indicates 100 prisoners for every 100,000
free adult residents of the United States. While the rate of imprisonment has
experienced change—the imprisonment rate went as high as 139 during the
Great Depression and down as low as the 80s during the years of the Vietnam
War—it began a rise after 1975 that has only leveled off in the past few years.
The criminal laws being produced by contemporary legislatures and
Congress are far more populist in their construction. There is little
jurisprudential or criminological depth to new penal statutes such as
California’s “Three Strike” law, upheld by the Supreme Court in 2003.11 Even

8. MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 13 (2002).
9. See generally MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (David
Garland ed., 2001).
10. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992).
11. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
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capital crimes are defined with regard to popular fears about things such as
drive-by shootings, gang activities, or even satanic rituals. It is not that these
laws cannot be discussed in terms of deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation,
and retribution, but only that they seem to radically underdetermine these laws
and the way they operate.
This leaves somewhat of a hole in the class, but it is a hole I am not sure I
want to fill. This hole will not cause harm to students. The one thing I want to
avoid is inoculating lawyers, some of who will be legislators, prosecutors, and
judges, with the conviction that American punishment is under the control of
law and thus more or less both democratic and rational.12 Instead, the first
class focuses on the legal and political changes that have brought us to an
unprecedented level of punishment in America and the collateral consequences
this penal excess is having on large segments of our society.13
II. MENTALITIES, OR HOW WE THINK ABOUT CRIMINAL LAW, HISTORICALLY
With the Code’s modernizing aspirations now fundamentally sidetracked
and yet not replaced by any competitor enterprise, I have found it useful to
make the theme of historical change in criminal law an analytic framework of
its own. In place of a jurisprudential analysis of policy choices among penal
objectives, I have tried to develop a historical reading of the canonical parts of
the Criminal Law class. Neither working within the Code, nor with an
ambition to replace it with a successor approach, I sought to make its rise and
its decline a kind of plotline for the court.
As a useful heuristic, crude but no more so than the fourfold division of
punishment discussed above, I divide the development of Anglo-American
criminal law into three distinct “mentalities” by which I mean “rationalities” or
styles of reasoning about criminal law: (1) a common law mentality, which
emerges during the sixteenth century; (2) a modern law mentality, beginning in
the first third of the twentieth century; and (3) a post-modern mentality
emerging in the late twentieth century. I put no end date because each of them
continues to a certain extent in the present.

12. Compare Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1628-29 (arguing
that violence is at the heart of judicial function, but that this places law in control of violence in
the United States), with Jonathan Simon, The Vicissitudes of Law’s Violence, in LAW, VIOLENCE,
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 17 (Austin Sarat ed., 2001) (arguing that Cover overestimated
the control law has over violence).
13. See Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population
Trends, in 26 PRISONS 63 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999).
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Figure 2

Common Law, 1550 --• Body
• Moral/Religious
• Objective
• Sovereign

A.

Common Law

Law is prone to using a term in more than one way. Terms like “due
process” or “jurisdiction” mean different things in different contexts. Few
words are more overused than “common law.” Sometimes it means the law of
England and its colonial societies, in contrast with the “civilian” legal systems
of the European continent. Sometimes it means law declared by judges, in
contrast to the “statutory law” created by legislatures. Still other times it
means law before the modern era.
It is in this last sense that I adopt the term to describe the way of reasoning
about criminal law associated with England and its colonial societies, including
the United States, that predominated before the twentieth century. This law
was sometimes declared by judges, but it also includes rules formally adopted
by legislatures and even codified. Most casebooks present an implicitly
historical framework in the analysis of different topics in the substantive
criminal law. The first case or cases will typically present the law as it stood
before the twentieth century. Referring to this as common law may invite
confusion. I make this implicit historicism explicit, while at the same time
eliminating the presumptive evolutionism that often goes along with a
treatment of how modern law progresses beyond the formalism and rigidity of
common law rules.
The focus here is less on particular legal rules, and more on how lawyers
and judges are encouraged to reason about criminal law. The elements I
identify with common law can be thought of as master themes that get worked
and reworked in different ways in different doctrines. These elements are
intended to help students identify how different courts’ reasoning about
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different problems can nevertheless make common aspects of the facts central
to their decisions.
1.

The Body

Michel Foucault famously argued that the rise of the prison represented the
triumph of a new technology of power in the realm of punishment (on its way
to a more general societal ubiquity): the disciplines, which made the explicit
target the mind, soul, or psyche.14 The earlier penal practices that the prison
displaced—public executions that were sometimes turned into ghastly public
torture sessions—had in contrast laid a very explicit claim to the body. The
common law fascination with the body is quite consistent with this history.
Common law judges and legislatures addressed their analyses more directly to
bodies, with physical movements, and with the visible signs that are emitted by
bodies engaged in criminal behavior.15 The fundamental (now constitutional to
some degree) requirement of a guilty act before a punishment can be imposed
is very much a living inheritance from the common law mentality. There is no
crime at all unless, in some way, the body gets involved. Modern law, as we
shall see, relaxes this in numerous ways. The Proctor16 decision discussed
above, quoted Blackstone:
Indeed, to make a complete crime cognizable by human laws, there must be
both a will and an act. For, though, in foro conscientiae, a fixed design or will
to do an unlawful act is almost as heinous as the commission of it, yet, as no
temporal tribunal can search the heart, or fathom the intentions of the mind,
otherwise than as they are demonstrated by outward actions, it therefore cannot
punish for what it cannot know. For which reason, in all temporal
jurisdictions, an overt act, or some open evidence of an intended crime, is
necessary in order to demonstrate the depravity of the will, before the man is
liable to punishment.17

This emphasis on the body, and the physical forces generally, can be traced
through many criminal law doctrines. The law of manslaughter requires that a
killing be “hot blooded.” This is a metaphor, to be sure, but not merely a
literary one.18 As a narrative with which judges were assigned to decide who
should be tried for manslaughter and who for murder, the hot-blooded
metaphor anchored a whole series of moves that focused analysis on the body
in space and time. Thus the “cooling” of the blood was said to follow a peak
14. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 16 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977).
15. A good example of this is the law of theft, which begins in the early common law period
criminalizing only those takings of property that involved a forcible dispossession from the
victim’s possession. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 919-20 (4th ed. 2004).
16. Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918).
17. Id. at 773.
18. See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 59 (2001).
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of provocation, and the passage of time between the provocative act and the
lethal response served as a primary rationale for judges to cut off consideration
for those killers the judges wished to expose to the death penalty—the
mandatory punishment for murder at common law.
Indeed the common law categories of manslaughter themselves almost all
require as provocation a physical assault of something closely analogous.
Common law judges in theory limited the opportunity for the jury to consider
manslaughter to those cases that fell near enough to certain canonical
categories of lethal violence.19 The earliest categories involved “physical
battery” or “mutual combat.”20 Mere insults were generally not recognized as
sufficient. The most famous, or infamous category, a killing following the
discovery of adultery by one’s spouse, required in its purest common law
forms actual “sight of adultery.” By the end of the nineteenth century, the
trend in American courts was toward relaxing this rule. Nevertheless, the
common law mentality remained operational as courts sought some indication
that the provoked killer had experienced a physical discovery of the adultery
rather than merely learning of it through “hearsay.” A nineteenth-century
Texas court allowed a manslaughter instruction when there was no actual
sighting but the aggrieved husband had discovered strong evidence of the
adultery in a direct and physical way:
It is a late hour of the night,—the parties are found in a corn crib some distance
from the house, lying down in the dark. They refuse, at first, to answer when
called; then, when the wife answers, she denies that any one is with her,—
when deceased gets up he clutches the gun,—defendant finds that the one
whose previous conduct and “carrying on” with his wife has excited his
suspicions is the one he has thus found in company with his wife. What would
any reasonable, sensible man have concluded from these circumstances?
....
As to a proper construction of the expression “taken in the act,” we cannot
believe that the law requires or restricts the right of the husband to the fact that
he must be an eye-witness to the physical coition of his wife with the other
party. As we have seen, adultery can be proven by circumstances, and the
circumstances in this case were not hearsay so far as this defendant was
concerned; they transpired in his own presence, sight and hearing.21

Likewise, the early definitions of the most aggravated killing, murder,
focused on the physical features of the killing, lying in wait or poisoning,
which involve more than the causally efficacious purpose to kill. They

19. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 384 (3d ed. 1996).
20. Id. at 390.
21. Price v. State, No. 3581, 1885 WL 6853, at *5-6 (Tex. Ct. App. Jun. 13, 1885).
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involved the way the killer conducted himself.22 One of the most colorful
pieces of common law language on the subject of murder frames precisely the
physicality of the common law mentality: “abandoned and malignant heart”
killing.23
There is no clearer example of the bodily nature of common law than the
treatment common law judges gave to the crime of rape. The traditional rule
that the female victim must receive injuries—physical signs on the body itself
of resistance to violence—speaks a fascination with the body that is almost as
grotesque as the rituals of the scaffold.24
2.

Religion

The common law mentality also rests in fundamentally moral or even
religious terms. A great deal of the discourse produced by common law judges
makes a lot more sense if we acknowledge this deeply religious view and
accept it as part of our reading of their analysis (I’ll get back to the opening we
may need to make to religion with regard to the post-modern mentality).
Essential to this religious worldview are the ideas of evil and pollution. The
two are actually the same. “Evil” is the word that believers give to the
characteristic of a person having a corrupted soul, for example, one in rebellion
against God. “Pollution” is a term also used by some of these believers. It
also has been adopted by anthropologists to describe the more generic feature
of cultural belief systems to define certain substances, people, and situations as
presenting a catastrophic risk to the well being of individuals and the
community.25

Figure 3: Cotton Mather to a condemned Salem “Witch”

“You are now to
dy….[because] the Land where
you now Live, would be
polluted, if you should be
spared from Death.”

22. Notice the issue is not, as it is in the contemporary law of capital aggravators, whether
the killing is especially painful to the victim.
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1999).
24. Like much of rape law, the analysis is as concerned with the behavior and motives of the
victim as with the perpetrator.
25. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 36 (1982).
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Analysis that begins with the modern law’s dilemma of choosing between
utilitarian and rights-based or moral theories of penal justice cannot appreciate
how nicely the cultural category of evil or pollution brings these things
together. The evil person is quintessentially dangerous to both the moral and
physical well being of the community. In making the boundary decisions over
criminal liability and grading, judges and juries must face the hard task of
deciding whose crime revealed a truly corrupt person as opposed to a soul still
in a relation, albeit possibly a faltering one, with God.26 Naturally the law
attempted to help them with formulas of various sorts. These formulas can be
read most coherently when recognizing their essentially religious nature.
The religiousness of common law is hammered home to many Criminal
Law students in one of the most celebrated cases in the modern criminal law
canon, the 1884 Queen’s Bench opinion in The Queen v. Dudley and
Stephens.27 The defendants, young men crewing a yacht to Australia, were
charged with killing and eating their shipmate Richard Parker after the three,
and a fourth party, who was not charged, were forced to take refuge in a raft
after the yacht foundered far out at sea.28 The jury had used a special verdict
form on which they had indicated that defendants Dudley and Stephens had
indeed killed Parker but had done so under dire circumstances in which the
action may have been their only hope for survival.29 The Queen’s Bench
declined to reverse the decision of the trial judge finding this murder and thus
rejected the possibility that taking a life could be justified on the necessity of
saving another or even several others.30 In ruling out any utilitarian debate
about whether taking the life may have been justified, the opinion directly
invoked the religious foundations of English common law. Declining to make
elaborate arguments for this hard line, the court stated, “[I]t is enough in a
Christian country to remind ourselves of the Great Example whom we profess
to follow.”31
3.

Objective

The concept of objectivity and its opposite, subjectivity, share with
common law the attribute of being overused in over-inclusive ways.
Moreover, common law judges themselves did not necessarily thematize the
property of objectivity itself. This would come later and was a kind of
retrospective recognition through the awareness of a modern mentality. But
26. This is not a question of salvation. The Christianity of the common law was open to the
soul of even the worst criminal being redeemed. It was that only for some the execution would
be a necessary, if not sufficient, part of the salvation.
27. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
28. Id. at 273-74.
29. See id. at 277.
30. See id. at 288.
31. Id. at 287.
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because contemporary criminal lawyers need to think through all three of the
existing mentalities, it is important to consider this aspect.
A less
anachronistic way of characterizing this attribute of the common law mentality
is in terms of its preference for criminalizing action whose wrongness is visible
and obvious rather than ambiguous and compatible with benign motives.
Thus the law of attempt, to the extent that the common law recognized it at
all, required careful parsing of the line between preparation and attempt. The
key question is whether the course of conduct has proceeded to the point where
its moral obnoxiousness or threat has become visible. In People v. Murray,32
the Supreme Court of California reversed a conviction for an “attempt to
contract an incestuous marriage,” because Murray, who apparently intended to
marry his niece, had not yet secured the presence of a magistrate, although he
had already sent for one.33
It shows very clearly the intention of the defendant, but something more than
mere intention is necessary to constitute the offense charged. Between
preparation for the attempt and the attempt itself, there is a wide difference.
The preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or measures
necessary for the commission of the offense; the attempt is the direct
movement toward the commission after the preparations are made.34

Of course judges were often begging the question when they invoked terms
like “necessary” or “continuous and natural sequence” in describing the law of
causation, but they had in mind the necessity of providing a definitive answer
one way or the other. This mandate to make law determinate is another
common law quality that gets thematized in the opinions of the Queen’s Bench
judges in the 1884 decision of The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens. The case,
as noted before, offers a kind of apologia for the common law mentality
precisely at the historical moment when the modernization of criminal law was
becoming more powerful.35 The lead opinion cites the great common law
digester Lord Hale for the proposition that: “if a person, being under necessity
for want of victuals or clothes, shall upon that account clandestinely and animo
furandi steal another man’s goods, it is felony, and a crime by the laws of
England punishable with death.”36
Thus, there is clearly no need to consider whether starvation could justify
Dudley and Stephens’ act of maritime cannibalism against their shipmate
Richard Parker.
32. 14 Cal. 159 (1859).
33. Id. at 159.
34. Id.
35. For a description of the transformation of penal practices and ideologies in the United
Kingdom in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth
century, see DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES
(1985).
36. Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. at 283.
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The opinion then acknowledges that the standard they have imposed on
Dudley and Stephens is one that they might not be able to live up to
themselves. It states:
We are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to
lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy. But a man has no right to
declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself have yielded to it,
nor allow compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any manner the
legal definition of the crime.37

Nevertheless, it is their duty to hold that the “facts as stated in the verdict are
no legal justification [for] homicide.”38 The law cannot take its measure from
human frailty. It must be anchored in something greater that makes it
determinate and, in that sense, objective.
4.

Sovereignty

The common law of England was the law produced by the King’s courts as
opposed to other manorial or ecclesiastical courts. The common law mentality
of criminal law retains this connection to sovereignty in the authority of its
judges to hand down normative judgments with reference to no authority other
than common law itself. This is a notion reflected more in the absence of the
problem of authority in common law opinions than the presence of arguments
grounded explicitly in the theory of sovereignty. Yet it also means that the
acceptance of common law by American state courts, often restated in statutes,
embedded a closer link to the King than post-revolutionary American law
generally acknowledged. There is little explicit need to invoke empirical
information about social conditions or even the hypothetical problem of
reasonableness. Thus, in the case of The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens,
discussed above, the Court readily assumed that Dudley and Stephens were
both bound by law to a higher duty than the preservation of their own lives.
The court’s examples of this speak directly to the importance of sovereignty.
The court stated:
To preserve one’s life is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest
and the highest duty to sacrifice it. War is full of duty, in instances in which it
is a man’s duty not to live, but to die. The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a
captain to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, of soldiers to women and
children, as in the noble case of the Birkenhead; these duties impose on men
the moral necessity, not of the preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives
for others, from which in no country, least of all, it is to be hoped, in England,
will men ever shrink, as indeed, they have not shrunk.39

37. Id. at 288.
38. Id. at 287.
39. Id.
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Figure 4. Common Law Mistake
Doctrine Assumptions
• Criminal law is part of a general system of
legal rules extending ultimately to divine
law
• Law is determinate
• Both society and nature exist apart from
law

Another example of this is the exculpating role of good-faith mistakes.
When a person in good faith is ignorant of the existence of fact, legal
definition, or rule of law that makes his or her actions liable, the proof
necessary for the prosecution may be in danger. In common law decisions,
only mistakes of fact were exculpating in this way; mistakes of legal definition
did not count, at least in theory. A case consistent with this view is a federal
decision from the nineteenth century, United States v. Learned.40 Learned held
irrelevant the defendant’s good-faith ignorance that the voucher he had issued
his employees payable in merchandise out of his store was a “contract” for
purposes of an internal revenue law and thus subject to a stamp tax. In the
view of the court, “[E]very man is presumed to know the law, and that
ignorance of the law is no excuse, as general propositions, are too well
established to admit of dispute.”41 The presumptions not discussed by this
proposition surround in varying degrees of separation the absent King of
England, whose rule included the interpretive work of common law courts.
First, the law, whether the law defining what counts as a contract for
purposes of the revenue laws, or the law defining crimes, is presumed to be
part of a continuous system ultimately anchored in the revealed truth of
religion. Second, this system is determinate and provides determinate answers
to any legitimate questions put to it. No one need speculate as to how their
conduct will be defined for legal purposes. Finally, law is clearly distinct from
both nature and society, which follow their own “natural” or “divine” laws.
The sovereign law may intervene in society, but it does not play any role in
constituting it.

40. 26 F. Cas. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1870) (No. 15,580).
41. Id. at 895.
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Modern Law

Most casebooks offer a number of opinions exemplifying the common law
mentality. These are usually presented as undergoing a pattern of decline as
courts increasingly relax the harsh assumptions of the common law. This
narrative of a clear but harsh common law giving way to a process of
interpretive relaxation is contrasted with an alternative ideal—one rooted in
distinctly modern ways of thinking about law and society. In most American
Criminal Law casebooks the model of the modern mentality is the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute. Most books also include leading opinions
of the California, New York, and other state high courts that exemplify modern
ways of thinking, but the Model Penal Code is dominant, so much so that it is
tempting to interpretively misread it as the Modern Penal Code.

Figure 5: Modern Law, 1900 --• Mind
• Analytic/Scientific
• Subjective
• Social

1.

Mind

Modern criminal law jurisprudence is at pains to deny that pure thought or
status can be a crime,42 but the very need to clarify that limit is a clue to how
much modern law makes the mind the measure of all things, at least all things
criminal. To be sure, there are reasons for modern law to avoid too close an
identification with scientific psychology and its popular but risky claims to
understand the criminal subject. Throughout the first half of the twentieth
century, criminal lawyers, jurists, and professors worried about the danger that
the human sciences would displace legal expertise from the center of criminal
law.43 Instead, modern law has thought to focus attention on the mental life of
individuals without being too explicit about the nature of that reality. The
whole topic of the mental state accompanying bad acts or circumstances is
present but very low-key in common law reasoning. While quick to defend the
42. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
43. See Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An
Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915, 1923-24 (1995).
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proposition that some culpable mental state is required, common law cases,
especially those present in contemporary casebooks,44 tend to treat mental life
as imminent in the acts and circumstances, rooted in their very moral
obnoxiousness or evil, rather than something that transcends the act altogether.
In contrast, the most developed expression of the modern mentality of criminal
law, the Model Penal Code, takes great pains to create a complex framework
for defining different levels of culpable mental state in a way that can be read
consistently across very different acts, circumstances, and result elements.
There is no simple criminal intention in the Code. Every separate bit of
conduct, circumstance, or result that a substantive crime definition includes
must have its own burden of proof with respect to the subject’s awareness.45
A powerful example of the hold of the mental over modern law is the
development of the law of provocation manslaughter. As we saw above,
common law courts limited manslaughter to those cases where a killing had
arisen out of a limited set of circumstances defined in terms of specific acts
and analyzed in terms of physical metaphors like “heat of passion.” Modern
cases shift the focus from the body and specific provocative physical
circumstances to the mind and the question of whether the killing was caused
by an emotional disturbance. The Model Penal Code’s provision is, once
again, exemplary:
[A] homicide that would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable
explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be.46

2.

Analytic-Scientific

While the common law mentality looked to religion to provide its
dominant normative criteria, the modern criminal law mentality turns to two
sometimes divergent sources of meaning, the political process and the human
sciences, to define the substantive ends that the system should pursue. The
association of modernism in criminal law with greater legislative authority
44. E.g., Regina v. Prince L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154 (1875) (holding that the prosecution was
required to show the defendant had acted with at least negligence when he accidentally set fire to
a ship while stealing rum).
45. As Markus Dubber notes in his treatise on the Model Penal Code:
The price of lucidity was complexity, and of the differentiation, confusion. The common
law had known two units of analysis: mens rea and actus reus. The Code recognized
seven, and that’s not even counting strict (mens-rea-less) liability. The quartet “purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence” took the place of mens rea, and conduct,
attendant circumstance, and result, that of actus reus.
DUBBER, supra note 8, at 51.
46. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 7, at § 210.3(1)(b).
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over criminal law is reflected in the importance given to rules of statutory
construction aimed at directing interpretation toward the policy ends preferred
by lawmakers with democratic authority. Thus the Model Penal Code provides
a series of explicit analytic rules for deciding what to do when no term
indicating the level of culpability is present or when an expression of
culpability in one part of a statute should be applied in other parts of the
statute.47 Indeed the pursuit of more precise analytic terms is a perennial quest
in the modern criminal law, and it reflects the imperative of allowing the
political process to speak.
In addition to a commitment to political accountability, the modern
mentality is heavily influenced by the rise of the human sciences in the
nineteenth century and their promise that institutions of law operate to solve
social problems. The goal of modern criminal law in this respect is to prevent
crime and to do so in ways that take maximum advantage of what can be
discerned about human nature from the positive sciences of humanity. For the
Model Penal Code, the challenge for criminal law is to balance the goal of
preventing crime through deterrence with the aspiration to treat those who are
not deterred. The concept of dangerousness, while rarely mentioned directly,
suffuses the Model Penal Code and other modernist efforts at reforming
criminal law.48
3.

Subjective

The modern law confronts objectivity and subjectivity as a problem for
itself in a way probably absent from the thinking of common law courts and
lawyers. If modern courts are nervous to embrace the often pejorativesounding quality of subjective, they also recognize that the centrality of the
subject is a potential strength in a society where law no longer fits around a
unified and coherent moral and religious common wealth. A good example is
the law of self-defense where modern courts have increasingly looked to the
individual qualities of a particular defendant, and his or her view of the
circumstances, in determining whether they were justified in using lethal force.
In an often-cited opinion expounding on how the law of self-defense applies to
a woman who had experienced battery in the past from the victim, her
husband, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held in favor of a “subjective”
standard for reasonableness, in which:
the issue is not whether the circumstances attending the accused’s use of force
would be sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable and prudent person
the belief that the use of force is necessary to protect himself against
immediate unlawful harm, but rather whether the circumstances are sufficient

47. Id. at §§ 2.02(3)-(4).
48. DUBBER, supra note 8, at 12.
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to induce in the accused an honest and reasonable belief that he must use force
to defend himself against imminent harm.49

The Code’s provision on provocation manslaughter exemplifies this
pursuit of a common ground forged in understanding across subjective
experiences. Replacing altogether the common law focus on “heat of passion,”
and thus cooling time, the Code specifically examines the mind of the
defendant and asks whether the person was under the influence of an “extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation.”50
The Code explicitly states that “[t]he reasonableness of such explanation or
excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”51
Reasonableness is the name an increasingly modern law will give to the freefloating standard required for stability in a post-conventional society.
The same modern mentality has influenced state courts in reconstructing
manslaughter doctrine, sometimes even in the face of statutes that embody
common law language. A strong example, discussed in many casebooks is the
1976 decision of the California Supreme court in People v. Berry.52 Berry was
convicted of murdering his wife, Rachel Pessah. Shortly after the marriage,
Rachel made a trip to her native land of Israel. When she returned about a
month and a half later, she informed Berry that she had fallen in love with
another man. Less then two weeks after her return, Rachel was strangled to
death by Berry in their apartment. Berry’s defense was that the killing had
taken place while he was in a state of uncontrollable rage. Berry blamed this
rage on the combined effects of Rachel taunting him with her unfaithfulness
while periodically sexually stimulating him and demanding sexual intimacy.
In addition to his own testimony, Berry presented the testimony of a
psychiatrist, Dr. Martin Blinder. Based on his examination of Berry—Blinder
never met Rachel—Dr. Blinder testified that Rachel “was a depressed,
suicidally inclined girl and that this suicidal impulse led her to involve herself
every more deeply in a dangerous situation with [Berry].”53 The trial court
permitted the testimony, but refused to instruct the jury that they could find
Berry guilty of manslaughter. Berry was convicted of murder. He appealed,
claiming that the judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter,
defined by California statute as “the unlawful killing of a human being,
without malice . . . upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”54

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 817 (N.D. 1983) (emphasis added).
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 7, at § 210.3(1)(b).
Id.
556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976).
Id. at 780.
Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1999)).
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The Attorney General, defending the trial court verdict, argued that
because Berry waited in their apartment for almost a whole day before
confronting and killing the victim, he could not have been under a heat of
passion. By any traditional notion of “cooling,” twenty-two hours was just too
long to stay legally provoked. The California Supreme Court reversed, relying
heavily on the testimony of Dr. Blinder. The Court made clear that an
individualized and scientifically informed analysis of Berry’s mental state was
determinative, rather than the amount of time or the bodily metaphors of heat
and cooling. The Court wrote:
[T]he long course of provocatory conduct, which had resulted in intermittent
outbreaks of rage under specific provocation in the past, reached its final
culmination in the apartment when Rachel began screaming. Both defendant
and Dr. Blinder testified that defendant killed in a state of uncontrollable rage,
of passion, and there is ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion
that this passion was the result of the long course of provocatory conduct by
Rachel . . . .55

4.

Social

Without a King to anchor the authority of the criminal law, modern law
looks to societal norms to determine the standards. One way of grounding law
in the social is to allow the jury to bring its own conception of community
standards to bear. The trend of modern courts has been to allow questions of
provocation, self-defense, duress, and others to go to the jury rather than
deciding them at the judicial level. In effect, courts no longer operate from a
sovereign grant of authority but rather as facilitators of society’s judgment.

Figure 6: Modern Law Mistake Doctrine
Assumptions
• Law is fragmented, civil law is quite
different then criminal law
• Law is indeterminate
• Law plays a role in constituting social
reality

55. Id. at 781.
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Mistake doctrine provides a window into this more social perspective on
the law. Modern criminal law tends to recognize both mistakes of fact and
mistakes of what can be called “non-governing law,” such as legal definitions
relevant to determining the applicability of specific crimes, as exculpating.
This recognition that some mistakes of law negate the prosecution’s required
proof reflects a social conception of law in three respects. First, law is seen as
fragmented into distinct specializations rather than as a unified system.
Second, there is recognition that law is indeterminate and that people can make
reasonable mistakes about whether they fit a particular legal definition relevant
to their criminal liability. Finally, there is a recognition that law helps
constitute the social world, which is the relevant context for attributing
criminal liability.
C. Post Modern Law
The common law and modern law mentalities more or less represent
transparent and coherent structures of knowledge and action. They define the
ways that criminal courts can know about and act on crime in terms consistent
with broader understandings. Most casebooks embrace some version of
“common law becomes modern law” because it describes the self
understanding that has, at least until recently, prevailed over the teaching of
Criminal Law since World War II. In that sense the framework thus far
developed is perfectly consistent with the dominant pedagogy which identifies
a modernizing trend in criminal law and seeks to characterize its dominant
logics. Where my framework diverges is in suggesting that criminal lawyers
ought to think of themselves as operating in what amounts to a post-modern
mentality. We can observe that the modern mentality no longer seems to be as
self-evident or to provide as satisfying an account as it once seems to have, but
no new understanding has radically reorganized the categories of this way of
thinking.

Figure 7: Post-Modern, 1968 --• Cyborg (e.g., carjacking)
• Populist/Risk
• Situational
• Privatized
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Cyborgs

If the common law focused on the body and the modern law focused on the
mind, postmodern law is characterized by the emergence of a new target, one
that fuses the human with the technological. The political theorist Donna
Haraway has used the term “cyborg” to describe “a cybernetic organism, a
hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a
creature of fiction.”56 To some extent this begins under the modern mentality
of law with the way possession crimes are defined. As Markus Dubber has
argued, making possession a crime should raise problems for the act
requirement because to be in possession of something is less an act than a
status.57 In recent decades, possession crimes have become more and more
important sources of criminal liability, playing a major role in the rise of the
imprisonment rate documented in Figure 1 above.
A good example of the focus of the post-modern mentality on cyborgs is
the priority given to prosecuting gun crimes in recent years. Laws making it a
crime to be a felon in possession of a firearm apply regardless of the act or
intentions of the offender, defining the very combination of being a convicted
felon and having a weapon as criminal threat.58 The target of the law is not the
behavior of these felons but the very combination of organism and machine. A
similar development is the growing number of states that make it an
aggravating factor, for death penalty purposes, if the killing was done from a
car or with an automatic weapon.59
Another powerful example of this post-modern trend is the Federal
government’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO),60
which developed the traditional concept of conspiracy law into a much broader
and more powerful weapon of law enforcement. The target of RICO
prosecutions is not individuals’ acts and intentions so much as it is an
“enterprise” that includes an individual or group of individuals, or formal or
informal organization.61

56. DONNA HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE
149 (1991).
57. DUBBER, supra note 8, at 40.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000).
59. See Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors
in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 81 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
61. Id. § 1961(4). “‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity.” Id.
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Populist Punitiveness and Risk Management

Both the common law and modern law mentalities looked outside of law
for other authoritative forms of knowledge that could shape the rules for
defining and attributing criminal liability. The postmodern mentality’s new
focus is on popular sentiment, particularly the American public’s desire for
more punitively expressive laws and more protection from criminal risk
instead of religion or science. Contemporary laws against sex offenders,
recidivists, and armed criminals all reflect this logic.62 These laws are populist
in the language they use that often seems to invoke the “in-your-face”
confrontationalism of prime-time television. Terms such as “sexual predator,”
or “three strikes and you’re out” reflect neither religion, nor science, nor even
jurisprudence so much as popular culture.

Figure 8: Poster advertising
Florida’s 10-20-Life in Spanish
• Use a gun and you’re
done
• What can we say
about our collective
conscience from this
popular new law in
Florida?

As the poster above shows, this new generation is designed to fit into a world
of popular commodity advertising.
3.

Situational

Rather than either the objective world of the common law mentality or the
pursuit of consensus within the realm of the subjective, postmodern law is
relentlessly situational, in the sense of pragmatic and flexible, with a focus on
reducing risk. RICO again provides a powerful example. The focus of
criminal liability here is on “enterprises” and “patterns” of behavior. What the
criminal law targets are not morally obnoxious acts or dangerous intentions (or
proclivities) but rather situations that pose a risk of possible criminal harm.
This is also reflected in the growing harshness with which the law treats
reckless and negligent behavior that is correlated with risk, without regard to
moral obnoxiousness or the dangerousness of the intentions or persons
involved.
62. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999) (California’s three strikes law); CAL.
WELF. & INST. §§ 6600-6609.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (California’s sexually violent predator
law).
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One of the strongest hints that the modern mentality is losing its purchase
on the field of criminal law is in the area of provocation manslaughter. As
noted above, cases such as People v. Berry63 reflected the power of the modern
mentality in the readiness of courts to work beyond the common law language
of statutes. When I first studied Criminal Law as a student, the then-recently
decided Berry case was treated by both teacher and students as correctly
decided and a positive indicator of the influence that modern sciences such as
psychiatry had on law and on the willingness of courts to open up law to the
realm of subjective experience. Today when I teach the Berry case, it feels
very different to both teacher and students. We notice how unfair it is that the
defense expert was allowed to testify to the mental state of a victim he never
met. We cringe at the court’s willingness to blame the victim for the violence
of her husband. We draw on and discuss recent scholarship suggesting that
Berry was a serial batterer with a proclivity for escalating violence against
women he could not control.64 It seems shockingly clear that modern law is, at
least in this instance, far less protective of women against the well-established
pattern of male intimate violence than the common law, which allowed male
rage to mitigate lethal violence only when caused by adultery and only when
the male had either witnessed it or at least responded the instant he learned of
it.
The move toward a post-modern situational justice is suggested by the
effort of feminist legal scholars to develop an alternative standard for
provocation manslaughter that would be more protective of women. A return
to “objective” common law categories based on the body seems impossible
(and would hurt many women defendants who tend to reach violence on a
slower curve then men). Instead, one leading article has proposed limiting the
modernist focus on subjective mental state to those circumstances where the
“emotional judgments are inspired by a belief in a ‘wrong’ that is no different
from the law’s own . . . .”65 Whatever the merits of this proposal, it
exemplifies the current tendency to focus on the situation rather than either the
objective or the subjective.
4.

Privatized

As suggested above, each mentality of the criminal law reflects an intuitive
sense of what law is reflecting. In the common law it is something like the
sovereign realm that defines what the law relates to and where it draws on for

63. 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976).
64. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill,
2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71 (1992); WILLARD GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE
GARLAND: A QUESTION OF JUSTICE (1982).
65. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense,
106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1337-38 (1997) (footnote omitted).
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authority and meaning. In the modern mentality, it is society to which the law
looks for its authority and meaning. Postmodern law is increasingly
fragmented and privatized. The interest of the law is not society as a whole, or
the sovereignty of its rulers, but specific communities defined either by their
special risks or status. New laws impose enhanced penalties for selling drugs
in proximity to schools. New aggravators in state death penalty statutes make
capital killings of the very young or very old, of pregnant women, and a
variety of different kinds of public employees. Hate crime legislation
enhances punishment for crimes directed at individuals of a particular group or
identity. Along with developments such as “community” policing, this trend
reflects a retreat from society as law’s interlocutors and towards a variety of
different kinds of community.
III. CONCLUSION: IT’S CULTURE STUPID!
While it is useful to associate each of these “mentalities” with a particular
period of relative dominance, it is more accurate to think of them as alternative
ways of knowing about and acting on the criminal law that are more or less
available to contemporary lawyers. At the heart of each of these are different
pathways by which the cultural knowledge available in historically specific
social contexts enters into legal judgment. The study of case law that
consumes American Criminal Law classes is all about how judges use
somewhat different techniques to bring facts and law together through the
manipulation of culture, such as the ensemble of narratives that provide
categories of meaning available in a particular historically specific society.
Each of the mentalities I have described represents a shift in the kind of
narratives which the law draws on.

Figure 9: Dominant Narratives
• Revealed Religious Truth
• Science and Analytic Moral Philosophy
• Multiple

Common law, as I have suggested above, draws heavily on religious
thinking and imagery. Modern law draws on analytic methods, mainly from
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twentieth century philosophy and science, to provide its categories. Perhaps
the most distinctive feature of our post-modern situation is the shear
multiplicity of narratives available for reasoning about and acting on criminal
law.
Figure 10: Discourses Infusing
Contemporary Criminal Law
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Psychologies
Criminologies
Feminism
Conservative Religious Thought
Liberal Religious Thought
Civil Rights
Neo-liberal Economics
Cognitive Science

There really is no post-modern mentality yet, in the sense of an emerging
consensus on how this multiplicity of narratives is relevant to interpreting and
applying the criminal law. In a sense I view my course as a practical exercise
in creating a mentality for the next generation of lawyers. By helping students
become aware of the role that historically specific narratives and discourses
play in making it possible to legally reason about crime, I hope my course
teaches them to work with the multiple sources of meaning and authority that
compete in our present age. Naturally this makes it more difficult to engage in
the project of reforming the criminal law by identifying its principles and
seeking to work out implications for various boundary-drawing problems. But
we are not in an age when academic legal scholars have much influence on the
making of criminal law. Instead we must make our contribution, if any, in the
preparation of new criminal law mentalities.
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